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“They sacrificed...for us, we need to 
give them a helping hand now”: Local 
reasoning in Combat Veteran’s Court 
Stacy Lee Burns 
Loyola Marymount University 
ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on local reasoning in Combat Veteran’s Court in terms of its 
combat veteran clientele. The perceived nature of the client-defendants as victim/of-
fenders who have paid a great price to protect us all and whose combat service is 
directly related to their criminality significantly alters the moral calculus in the 
court. This altered moral calculus finds its way into the institutional encounters ad 
hoc, in the local relevancies, particulars, and contingencies of the case-at-hand, and 
in the prospects for ‘what can happen’, given what has already occurred. Combat 
Veteran’s Court is working out the fundamental terms of moral identity ad hoc, in 
the circumstantiality of the case as it presents itself now. This work moves social 
control away from the punitive approach of traditional criminal courts, or the ab-
stinence-or-punishment approach of most other problem-solving courts, and to-
ward an approach that is unique to combat veterans. The court’s accomplishment 
of its unique operation is an analyzable achievement, and Garfinkel’s ‘unique ade-
quacy requirement of methods’ is fleshed out in relation to the materials under in-
vestigation. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports on findings from an ethnomethodological and ethnographic 
study of a Combat Veteran’s Court in California. The study is part of a larger 
project that examines how drug courts and other problem-solving courts operate 
(Burns and Peyrot 2003, 2008, Peyrot and Burns 2010). While much existing re-
search investigates how problem-solving courts differ from traditional criminal 
courts (e.g., Boldt 2010; Castellano 2011; Mackinem and Higgins 2009; Nolan 
2001, 2009; Wolff 2002), with a few exceptions (e.g., Burns and Peyrot 2003), not 
much research has explored what makes each kind of problem-solving court 
unique and distinctive in its own right. The present research addresses this 
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question in the context of one of the newest kinds of problem-solving courts, vet-
eran’s court. The study is informed by Harold Garfinkel’s early insights into ‘Shils’s 
complaint,’ and his later discussion of unique adequacy in ethnomethodological 
studies (Garfinkel 1996). 
Over 50 years ago, Garfinkel referred to ‘Shils’s complaint’, in connection with 
the (in)famous 1950’s Chicago Law School Jury Project, which involved the secret 
bugging of jury deliberations in Wichita, Kansas by researchers from the Univer-
sity of Chicago and became the basis for the well-known book entitled, The Amer-
ican Jury (Kalven and Zeisel 1966). Garfinkel’s account of Edward Shils’s com-
plaint regarding this jury research is quoted in the Pulsar paper by Garfinkel, 
Lynch and Livingston: “In 1954 Fred Strodtbeck was hired by the University of 
Chicago Law School to analyze tape recordings of jury deliberations obtained 
from a bugged jury room...When Strodtbeck proposed to the law school faculty 
that they administer Bales Interactional Process Analysis categories to study the 
deliberations, Shils complained, ‘By using Bales Interaction Process Analysis [‘IPA’] 
I’m sure we’ll learn what about a jury’s deliberations makes them a small group. 
But we want to know what about their deliberations makes them a jury’” (Gar-
finkel, Lynch and Livingston 1981: 133, emphasis added). At the time of Gar-
finkel’s comment, Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis (Bales 1951) was a widely 
used method of ‘content analysis’ in social psychology and a way “to reduce the 
hours of tape-recorded jury deliberations to a manageable, statically analyzable 
data base” (Lynch 1993, p. 7). However, by coding the jurors’ interactions in terms 
of Bales’ IPA categories, researchers would “lose the very phenomenon” that they 
proposed to examine (Garfinkel 1996, p. 7). This paper addresses ‘Shils’s com-
plaint’ in the context of the present study, asking what makes this a Combat Vet-
eran’s Court? 
THE EMERGENCE OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND 
THE COURT’S ACHIEVEMENT OF ITS PARTICIPATORY STATUS 
In terms of the historical ‘context,’ what are problem-solving courts, and Combat 
Veteran’s Courts specifically, and how did they arise? Problem-solving courts 
emerged out of widespread agreement that the ‘drug war’ and other ‘get tough’ 
criminal justice policies of the 1980’s and 1990’s had essentially failed: their im-
pacts were discriminatory and fell disproportionately on people of color, the poor 
and other marginalized populations (Boldt 2010, Gross 2010), they were prohib-
itively expensive, they did not rehabilitate offenders, and they overloaded the crim-
inal justice system at every level (Ryan 1998). In response, there has been a wave 
of newly implemented, potential solutions to low-level crimes in the courts, in the 
form of various problem-solving courts that have been implemented across the 
country at a rapid pace, starting with the original drug courts (Burns and Peyrot 
2003). Not only have the number of drug courts expanded, but there has also been 
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the development and expansion of many other types of problem-solving courts 
(Heward 2007; Nolan 2009), including juvenile drug court, mental health court, 
dual diagnosis court, driving under the influence (‘DUI’) court, domestic violence 
court, prostitution court, homeless court, community court, re-entry court and 
very recently, veteran’s court (Marek 2008; Gambill 2010). As of June 2013, the 
National Institute of Justice reported that there were over 3200 problem-solving 
courts operating nationally, including more than 2800 drug courts and 145 vet-
eran’s courts, with many more in the planning or implementation stage.  
Problem-solving courts differ from conventional criminal courts in their greatly 
reduced adversarialism and de-emphasis of formal due process. These courts are 
characterized by supporters as emphasizing cooperation and collaborative deci-
sion-making by an inter-disciplinary ‘team’ of legal and non-legal professionals, 
both internal and external to the criminal justice system. Advocates argue that 
problem-solving courts promise a more ‘holistic’ approach to dispensing justice -- 
one that acknowledges the interconnectedness, mutual accountability, and recip-
rocal obligations of community members toward each other (Zehr 2002). These 
courts are also described by supporters as ‘holistic’ in that they offer therapeutic 
outcomes that address the often multiple and compound issues which arise for 
clients as ‘whole persons’, such as co-occurring substance abuse, mental health 
problems, homelessness and/or unemployment. Yet none of these general descrip-
tions specify the court’s achievement of its operation, or how its participatory sta-
tus is practically accomplished.  
D. Lawrence Wieder’s early ethnographic study of residents and staff in a half-
way-house for paroled drug offenders gives some guidance on how to demonstrate 
such an achievement. Wieder discussed the relevance of ‘telling the convict code’ 
in that setting and developed the ethnomethodological idea of rules as methods 
for formulating settings (Wieder 1974). He showed that reference to the maxims 
of the ‘code’ (e.g., do not interfere with other residents’ interests, do not trust staff, 
etc.) was a consequential social practice and way of taking action and describing 
events in the house that often persuasively structured the sense-making. But 
Wieder also found that use of the code to provide for the accountability of conduct 
was an ongoing, contingent and situated accomplishment that could be contested 
or undermined in specific circumstances by those who were present and interact-
ing in the house (Wieder 1974). 
Similarly, the following data in Combat Veteran’s Court shows how the court’s 
reasoning may be challenged, and ultimately how its collaborative decision-mak-
ing is practically accomplished. In the excerpt, whether the client ‘relapsed’ or not 
is in dispute. The client contends that he did not relapse or go absent without leave 
(‘AWOL’) to use drugs, but simply got separated from his chaperone when he went 
to use the bathroom. However, he did not report back to staff until three o’clock 
in the morning and the judge rejects his defense. The court characterizes the client 
as having issues with dishonesty (not uncommon among addicts) and orders him 
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to de-toxify in custody. In so ruling, the judge invokes the collaborative decision-
making of the ‘team’ to assemble a shared account of what will count as ‘relapse’. 
The client resists this depiction and the custodial sanction, asserting that “the only 
reason” he didn’t acknowledge what happened was because he’d been prescribed 
de-tox medication and didn’t think it was a relapse: 
 
Judge:  The team has recommended that you really do need to…continue your de-
tox time in custody. They’re recommending a week, so we’re going to 
see you back here on the 8th. We are by no means giving up on you. 
But without honesty, none of us can progress. So I really implore you 
to work very hard… 
Veteran:  The only reason I didn’t tell the JOC that it was a relapse is 
because I didn’t think it was because I was prescribed the medication 
and I’m de-toxing Your Honor. I’m clean…[and] continuing with 
treatment… 
Judge:  I understand…but the entire team that’s working with you…all believe 
that there needs to be a consequence for your bad decisions [and] 
that continued lying, so we’ll see you back on the 8th…Turn this 
around! You’ve got great potential and you certainly can do it, and 
everybody here wants to help you do it.  
Veteran:  Alright, Thanks. 
 
The decision-making achieved in this interchange is communitarian, but as 
such, it is also potentially authoritarian. What comes to count as a ‘relapse’ devel-
ops out of the situated use of the term in the interchange.  
SETTING AND METHODS 
The Combat Veteran’s Court in this study is located in Citrus County (pseudo-
nym), California and operates out of the Justice Center/Superior Court of Califor-
nia building that was designed to house various programs to serve the combat 
veteran participants. Human services are provided by dozens of organizations and 
agencies that have offices in the court building. For example, there is a Social Se-
curity benefits office, a re-entry job training and vocational rehabilitation coordi-
nator, a psychologist, and an outreach team of representatives from the Police De-
partment and Public Defender’s offices, as well as housing assistance, and several 
non-profits that share office space in the Justice Center building.  
The demographics of the court are: 9% female and 91% male, with ages of the 
participants ranging from 18 to over 60 years of age, with 64% of clients between 
22-30 years of age. The racial composition of the court is: 9% African American, 
4% Asian American, 50% Caucasian and 36% Hispanic. 63% of the veteran par-
ticipants are unemployed (Citrus County Collaborative Courts Annual Report, 
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2012). The cases being handled by the court include driving under the influence 
(‘DUI’), drug possession, assault, domestic violence, public intoxication, and other 
crimes. The program is generally a minimum of 18-months in duration, although 
there is a shorter track of 12 months for selected misdemeanor offenders. Client 
diagnoses include post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’), traumatic brain injury 
(‘TBI’), substance abuse, and other psychological disorders resulting from combat 
service. Clients consent to participate in the court-supervised treatment program 
(though it is often more of a ‘coerced voluntarism’ [Peyrot 1985]), enter a guilty 
plea, and must demonstrate a willingness to comply with the conditions of proba-
tion and community-based treatment, i.e., a ‘suitability’ admission criteria (Burns 
and Peyrot 2003).  
Decisions regarding admission into the court are made collaboratively by the 
team, based on the applicable Penal Code law defining ‘combat’ (California Penal 
Code, section 1170.9) and based on the exercise of discretion, with consequential 
input provided by every member of the court team. The District Attorney consid-
ers the nature of the candidate’s current criminal charge and any past criminal 
history. The Public Defender argues for the least restrictive and least punitive out-
come. The Probation Officer determines the candidate’s willingness for commu-
nity-based treatment and compliance (a criteria oriented to identifying and weed-
ing out candidates who are regarded as less likely to succeed). The Justice Out-
reach Coordinator obtains documentation from the Veteran’s Administration 
(‘VA’) to verify that the applicant served in a ‘combat theater’ and documents that 
the person suffers from a mental condition related to their combat service. In ad-
dition, admission to the court is limited to veterans who received an Honorable 
Discharge from the military and thus qualify for VA benefits and services. This 
latter admission criterion is probably more about caseload management and ac-
cess to treatment resources than about the suitability of any prospective client for 
rehabilitation. 
After acceptance, an individualized treatment plan is developed and clients re-
ceive ongoing treatment and attend individual counseling sessions and group ther-
apy meetings, regular court hearings, and weekly meetings with the Justice Out-
reach Coordinator and Probation Officer. Clients have frequent and random drug 
and alcohol testing (unless the team determines that the client does not have a 
substance abuse problem), and work to develop a plan for life after graduation. 
The Combat Veteran’s Court program has a four-phase structure, with each suc-
cessive stage typically becoming less burdensome as the client progresses (e.g., less 
frequent drug testing or court appearances). Over the course of the program, the 
judge follows the progress of clients and periodically observes their appearance 
and demeanor in court for improvement, or other changes. In order to make pro-
gress and graduate, clients are expected to adhere to the treatment regimen and 
all program rules and requirements and, more generally, to demonstrate self-dis-
cipline and self-change. 
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Case processing in Combat Veteran’s Court is fundamentally different from 
what occurs in traditional criminal courts, where the judge is commonly construed 
as a detached and impartial, bureaucratic neutral. Problem-solving judges, by con-
trast, can be seen to develop personal relationships with each of the defendants 
(euphemistically called ‘clients’). They craft interventions based on individualized 
knowledge and accumulated information about the client’s progress (or regress), 
and serve as advocates, if not cheerleaders, for rehabilitation. The courts use a 
‘tough love’ process of rewards and sanctions to keep clients in compliance and 
engaged in treatment (Burns and Peyrot 2003). Sanctions include community ser-
vice, more frequent drug testing, treatment sessions or court appearances, writing 
an essay to explain misconduct, placement in a residential treatment facility, brief 
jail time or ‘shock incarceration’, and removal from the program with imposition 
of criminal sentencing, typically with harsher punishment for those who fail than 
for offenders who are conventionally sentenced (Boldt 2010). Rewards are also 
routinely distributed in problem-solving courts to give reinforcement to clients 
who appear to be progressing and these vary from applause, to giving tokens or 
gifts (like movie tickets), less frequent drug testing and/or court appearances, 
granting travel privileges, words of support and encouragement, advancement of 
phases and, ultimately graduation.  
This ethnographic and ethnomethodological study of work addresses a distinc-
tive domain of reasoning and activities in Combat Veteran’s Court. The research 
draws on prior ethnomethodologically-informed studies of court activities, plea 
negotiations and responsibility attributions (Burns and Peyrot 2003; Emerson 
1969; Garfinkel 1967; Holstein 1993; Lynch 1997; Peyrot 1985; Pollner 1979). 
The paper seeks to identify and analyze the local reasoning, interpretive activities, 
descriptions and categorizations, interactional practices and institutionally specific 
competencies that comprise the work in question (Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel and 
Sacks 1970; Hester and Eglin 1997; Lynch 1997; Sacks 1974, 1979; Wieder 1974). 
The study pursues an ethnomethodological interest in “what local people consider 
meaningful [and] making their concerns accessible to readers who are unfamiliar 
with their social world” (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995: 108). In so doing, the 
research adopts a stance of ethnomethodological indifference that suspends judg-
ment on whether the self-presentations of clients are honest, the judge and court 
team members’ interpretations are accurate, or the interventions taken are effec-
tive in accomplishing rehabilitation aims (Burns and Peyrot 2003; Garfinkel and 
Sacks 1970). 
This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (‘IRB’) at my 
university and utilizes a variety of data, including field notes, tape-recorded inter-
views and transcripts, and raw footage of filmed recordings of courtroom interac-
tions, as well as interviews with the presiding judge, other court staff and several 
participants in the program. The filmed records were made by a documentary 
filmmaker on several of the days that I was observing in court, and I was granted 
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privileged access to the films by the documentary film company, which had been 
given access and permission to film by the judge. The availability of these filmic 
records made possible the close examination of the practical tasks and unfolding 
work activities of courtroom participants in their ‘local orderliness’ (Garfinkel 
1996). In addition, the data contain documents provided by the Justice Outreach 
Coordinator, including the Final Report of Combat Veteran’s Court’s two-year 
Pilot Program (2010), several quarterly reports on the court prepared in 2009 and 
2010, and the ‘Progress Report for Client’ form (used by the Probation Depart-
ment). Finally, the data include media accounts of my field site court and other 
veteran’s courts nationwide and concerning the health-related problems of justice-
involved veterans from public print and on-line newspaper sources, such as a daily 
legal newspaper (the Los Angeles Daily Journal) and other legal publications (e.g., 
California Lawyer) that were reviewed concurrently with the field research and 
after the fieldwork period.  
Observations and interviews were conducted during 2009 and 2010. Combat 
Veteran’s Court met once a week for scheduled status hearings at which clients 
appear and their individual progress is formally assessed and sanctions or rewards 
are ordered. I observed a total of eleven open court sessions, lasting about two to 
two and a half hours each, with approximately twenty to twenty-five cases ob-
served at each session, including three or four cases being considered for admis-
sion. The court team also assembled in ‘backstage’ meetings prior to the day’s 
scheduled court session to discuss each client whose case was on the docket and 
for such specific purposes as evaluating candidates for admission, discussing indi-
vidualized treatment plans, monitoring clients’ progress and compliance and rec-
ommending specific sanctions. I did not have access to these backstage meetings. 
COMBAT VETERAN’S COURT AS A SPECIAL KIND OF 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT WITH A UNIQUE CLIENTELE 
AND TREATMENT TEAM 
As more and more veterans returned home from Iraq and Afghanistan and other 
recent military conflicts, their combat experience and military-related traumas 
made it difficult for them to re-integrate into society. After risking their lives and 
health for our country, reports indicated that veterans came home with particular 
kinds of disorders: post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’), traumatic brain injury 
(‘TBI’), high rates of substance abuse, military sexual trauma, and other serious 
mental problems. These problems were frequently exacerbated by repeated de-
ployments and prolonged combat exposure (Gaskell 2009a and 2009b; RAND 
2008). As a result, combat veterans often suffered from chronic pain and were 
prescribed opiates and other powerful and addictive pain-killers. Returning veter-
ans also often had difficulty obtaining necessary physical and mental health care. 
Thus, many experienced unmet treatment needs (Markon 2011) and developed 
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substance abuse disorders and addictions related to their efforts to ‘self-medicate’ 
(RAND 2008). 
Until 2008, military veterans who were charged with a crime were tried in the 
same court as any other criminal defendant. But after acknowledging the unique 
experience of veterans, especially those who served in combat, and how war can 
impact the mind, the criminal justice system created special courts for veterans. 
The first specialty court to deal exclusively with veterans opened in Buffalo, New 
York in January, 2008 (Russell 2009). The interest and willingness of judges and 
court administrators to implement a specialized, alternative court for veterans re-
flected a unique understanding of the social meaning and moral status of being a 
justice-involved veteran/combat veteran. The social esteem accorded to persons 
with veteran/combat veteran status, the similar problems and issues they faced, 
and the cause of their criminality being located in their military combat served to 
mitigate against a fully punitive response. Instead, it suggested the reasonableness 
and moral justification for treating combat veterans together in a separate, non-
adversarial court forum oriented to providing services and facilitating their recov-
ery and re-integration into society, as the Combat Veteran’s Court judge explains 
in the following excerpt: 
We as a society owe it to our veterans to do everything we can to help them over-
come the problems that resulted from their military service...We can’t allow them 
to struggle and keep intersecting with criminal justice, and be treated…by sending 
them off to jails and prisons and punitive responses. That’s inhumane. They sacri-
ficed who they were for us, we need to give them a helping hand now and provide 
them with reasonable supportive services, so that they can be returned to our com-
munity as healthy, productive, happy human beings (Interview with Judge, 2010).  
These comments indicate that the court responds to its clientele as people to 
whom credit and the obligations of the state are owed and as persons the court 
“worries about.” This understanding of the nature of the veteran court’s clientele 
differs greatly from the conventional view of common criminals as freely willed, 
rational actors who are worthy of blame and proportionate punishment. 
The judge in Combat Veteran’s Court operates as the leader or hub of the court 
‘team’ and its activities -- a ‘therapeutic administrator’ -- who coordinates numer-
ous community-based services in attempt to address the client’s various presenting 
problems and needs. The Combat Veteran’s Court is itself a partnership with the 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs’ Healthcare System, which provides treatment 
resources for the clients. The judge makes use of these and other available institu-
tional resources to divert clients out of jail or prison and into community-based 
treatment and services.  
The team in Combat Veteran’s Court consists of the judge (‘J’), the district at-
torney (‘DA’), the public defender (‘PD’), the justice outreach coordinator (‘JOC’), 
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the probation officer (‘PO’), treatment providers, counselors and various commu-
nity ‘partners’ and ‘mentors’ (e.g., local colleges and churches). While many of 
these team members are a familiar part of other problem-solving courts (e.g., the 
judge, district attorney, public defender, probation officer, and treatment providers 
and counselors), there are also several newly invented positions which are unique 
to Combat Veteran’s Court, including the Justice Outreach Coordinator (‘JOC’), 
who is essentially a case and care manager funded by the Veteran’s Administration. 
In addition, each combat veteran client is matched with a volunteer combat vet-
eran mentor from the Veteran’s Peer Specialist Program (‘VPS’). The mentor, who 
is informally known as a ‘battle buddy’, usually comes from the same branch of 
the military and/or has suffered similar issues or problems to those of the client 
and overcome them. The mentor is expected to keep in regular contact with their 
client and empathetically guide them through the court program, providing sup-
port and useful counsel when needed. Thus, clients are embedded in a community 
of volunteer combat veteran mentors and fellow combat veteran clients who are 
used therapeutically to accomplish the client’s engagement in and completion of 
treatment. These institutional features make Combat Veteran’s Court very differ-
ent from regular criminal courts and also distinct from other problem-solving 
courts. 
The clientele of Combat Veteran’s Court are almost all male and share a dis-
tinctive military culture and training that emphasizes rules, authority and struc-
ture. The combat veteran clients have been through the same war-related traumas 
and share similar diagnoses. Their combat experience is very difficult for ordinary 
civilians to grasp and generates a camaraderie of peer support, mutual trust and 
understanding. The combat veteran clients know each other and are often in the 
same therapy group. They come to court for regular appearances, sit together in 
the audience section of the courtroom and watch each other’s hearings with the 
judge. Fellow combat veterans are also sometimes invoked by the court in the 
interactions as ‘local precedent’ for a particular response or intervention.  
Like other problem-solving courts, Combat Veteran’s Court addresses a partic-
ular clientele with a distinctive kind of problem or set of problems. But unlike 
clients in drug court who must remain drug-free throughout the program, combat 
veterans clients are typically required to take prescribed medications to manage 
their chronic physical pain and/or mental disorders. This often complicates deter-
minations of drug misuse and relapse by clients in Combat Veteran’s Court. Also 
in contrast to clients in drug court, who have all committed a substance abuse-
related offense, clients in Combat Veteran’s Court have committed a wide variety 
of misdemeanor and felony offenses, including non-violent and some violent 
crimes. Finally, different from clients in most other problem-solving courts, clients 
in Combat Veteran’s Court are required to be first-time offenders who have no 
prior criminal record or criminal justice involvement before returning home from 
combat. In terms of the reasoning of the court, the substance abuse, mental health 
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and other problems of the clientele are the result of their combat and are directly 
linked to their criminal offending, as the judge suggests in the following excerpt: 
One of the things we do is look at a person’s history before they served our country. 
If they have no intersection at all with criminal justice, then we would conclude that 
their intersection now is a result of probably PTSD, TBI, and of course substance 
abuse... 
The court aims to produce significant self-change in the clientele by addressing 
these types of problems which are perceived to underlie the clients’ poor choices 
and criminal conduct. 
‘Self-change’ in the recovery process has previously been studied by social con-
structionists in several organizational settings, including Alcoholics Anonymous, 
battered women’s shelters, and recovery programs for violent offenders in prison 
(e.g., Fox 2001; Loseke 1989; Pollner and Stein 2001). Such constructionist re-
search considers how these self-change programs create individuals who attribute 
a certain kind of moral subjectivity to themselves (Rose 1996). However, follow-
ing Lynch’s early work on ‘interactional troublemakers’, instead of addressing self-
change as subjectively problematic, the present research considers the ‘self’ as “a 
social and normative construct as much as an internal province of operations” 
(Lynch 1983: 162).  
In the local reasoning of Combat Veteran’s Court, the ‘selves’ of the clients are 
at stake. Thus, the supervision, monitoring and control of clients is extensive and 
intensive, with regular mandatory appearances in court and their frequent partic-
ipation in sometimes intense face-to-face interactions with the judge. Clients in 
Combat Veteran’s Court are rendered responsible and accountable for their con-
duct and choices in the court’s institutional terms through individualized treat-
ment regimens and the imposition of sanctions. Court professionals and the com-
bat veterans going through the self-change program work to get other people, here 
and now, to see the individual client as being a particular sort of person or ‘self’. 
And, that local structuring of ‘self’ organizes and constrains the local reasoning 
and activities in court. In essence, Combat Veteran’s Court is playing out the fun-
damental terms of moral identity and doing it ad hoc, in the circumstantiality of 
the case-at-hand as it presents itself now, akin to the ad hocing practices described 
by Garfinkel, where coders of clinic records worked to achieve a fit between what 
could be read in the records and the singular state of patient affairs and history 
which the coding sheet formulated (Garfinkel 1967). 
THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF VIOLENCE BY COMBAT VETERANS 
Central to the local reasoning in the court is a distinctive understanding of the 
nature of veteran’s crime and veteran’s violence as not just another run-of-the-mill 
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crime or another run-of-the-mill violent crime. Admission decisions in cases of 
violence involve discretionary assessments of the circumstances of the crime and 
the nature of the violence in the given case. The decision to admit some violent 
offenders reflects the idea is that a candidate’s worthiness for treatment should not 
be based on the kind of crime committed, but rather on whether a combat-related 
mental health disorder was at the root of their violent criminal offending. The 
Combat Veteran’s Court generally does not accept cases involving what is deter-
mined to be ‘serious assault’ (compare Emerson 1994), sexual assault, or crimes 
where the offender used a deadly weapon. In addition, registered sex offenders 
and those convicted as drug dealers are precluded by law from participating (Lum 
2014: 8).  
It is not surprising that the violent crimes committed by combat veterans are 
construed very differently from the way violent crimes are otherwise understood 
by participants in the criminal justice system. In the local reasoning of the court, 
the military itself is responsible for training combat veterans to be violent in the 
first place, as the judge explains in discussing her admission decisions in the fol-
lowing data: 
[Unlike some veteran’s courts], I do take violent clients...in [my] veteran’s court. I 
believe that these individuals have been trained to be killing machines…and they’ve 
been in an environment where they need to react first and think later, or they lose 
their lives. When they come back to us and try to reintegrate into society, [and] at 
the same time…they’re dealing with their post traumatic stress disorder,…they’ve 
seen children die and buddies die and been shot at so much, and perhaps they have 
traumatic brain injury as well…All these issues…make it hard to hold a job, hard 
to get along with others in the first place, and then they start drinking and using 
drugs to try to deal with their pain...and their disappointments and ...they intersect 
with criminal justice… 
For the client/defendants, such local reasoning serves to rewrite the terms of 
their moral agency, away from that of a violent and/or crazy offender and into 
someone who was damaged in service to us all and to whom compassion, empathy 
and the resources of the state are owed. 
‘LOCAL PRECEDENT’ FOR SUCCESS IN SELF-TRANSFORMATION 
Combat veteran clients who are making good progress are sometimes used by the 
judge as role models for other combat veterans who are relapsing or regressing, to 
show them that recovery and self-transformation is possible. Reminiscent of Mel-
vin Pollner’s work (1979) in Traffic Court on managing ‘local precedence’ and the 
retrospective-prospective relations among a series of cases, the judge in the next 
data uses her accumulated experience with what has happened in ‘similar cases’ 
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in the past as ‘local precedent.’ The court invokes this precedent as the basis for 
predicting what will likely happen down the line in the case-at-hand. The judge 
describes the combat veteran before her as someone who previously denied relapse 
(just like the client in the preceding case), but who is now “back on track”: 
 
Judge: How are you doing Eddie [pseudonym]? … Everyone says you’re back on 
track. 
Veteran: I am. 
Judge: Good. So maybe that’s a guy you need to talk to… over there 
[indicating the client whose case was previously called who denied 
relapse]. 
Veteran: (Laughter) Yeah, I’ve heard that same excuse—it just doesn’t work.  
Judge: So, Bruce [pseudonym, referring to the client in the earlier case who 
denied relapse], are you listening to what Eddie’s saying? Because 
he’s another one who tested dirty, and at first he said ‘no, no, no’. 
And you know, when he accepted that he does have a problem with 
opiates his life, he really started to change. And that’s all we’re 
hoping for with you.  
 
The progressing client’s ‘same excuse’ formulation of the earlier client refers to 
local understandings about the typical behavior of ‘addicts,’ i.e., a ‘category 
bound’ activity (Sacks 1974; 1979), “expectably done by persons who are the in-
cumbents of particular categories” (Hester and Eglin 1997: 5). This formulation 
is immediately upgraded by the judge adding, “he’s another one who tested dirty, 
and at first he said ‘no, no, no’”. In the moral economy of Combat Veteran’s Court, 
a client who acknowledges his relapse and set-backs exhibits a self that is of a 
higher moral status than a client who offers excuses and remains in ‘denial’ 
(Rosenhan 1973; Szasz 1963).  
Such moral sorting of clients orients to the retrospective, prospective and con-
tingent features of the case, to make sense of what has previously happened and, 
in light of that, to demonstrate what can be done now. As for ‘Eddie’, the client 
who’s ‘turned it around’ and becomes a virtual poster boy for redemption, one 
wonders, what if he falls off the wagon? The specter of ‘ritual degradation’ is still 
there, hanging in the shadows, and is occasionally pointed to (Garfinkel 1956). 
PRODUCING FAILURE: “YOU THREW AWAY ALL THE INFORMATION 
WE WERE PROVIDING YOU WITH TO HAVE A BETTER LIFE”  
Adversarialism and formal due process are typically minimized in Combat Vet-
eran’s Court, even when a client relapses or violates another program requirement, 
especially early in the program. However, sometimes the court professionals col-
lectively decide to remove a client from the program because of a dramatic or 
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extreme event that clearly demonstrates that all efforts to produce self-change 
have failed. At such a point, the client is given his ‘day in court’ and full adversarial 
airing of grievances. For example, the client in the following excerpt is being dis-
missed from the program after being arrested for driving under the influence 
(‘DUI’). He happens to be the oldest combat veteran in the program (in his sixties) 
and comes from a different war than the other clients (the Vietnam war), which 
perhaps limited his ability to benefit from peer support provided by the court in-
stitution. The interchange has a ‘last straw’ quality (Emerson 1981) as the client 
is brought into the courtroom wearing jail attire and is sternly sentenced by the 
judge to 180 days in jail and five years probation: 
 
Judge: [To client] … You’re not going to get back in this court. You 
committed an act that violated public safety. Your decision [and] 
your bad choices … [are] stunning. You’re the very first person to 
get terminated. You are terminated because you violated the safety 
rights of others… You drove while under the influence … with a prior 
DUI and license suspension within 10 years. [I’m sentencing you to] 
five years in formal probation and 180 days in County jail… 
Completely irresponsible… You threw away all the information we were 
providing you with to have a better life. You need to learn to be 
accountable and responsible for your actions and choices … I truly 
wish you the best. I am very sad we have come to this point. 
 
This client’s ‘problems’ are not going to be solved in the Combat Veteran’s 
Court. But even when kicking the client out of the program, the caring judge ex-
presses collective regret that she has no alternative and offers the now former cli-
ent best wishes and general guidance for the future [“you need to learn to be ac-
countable and responsible for your actions and choices”]. 
CONCLUSION  
The dual status of justice-involved combat veterans as both victims and offenders 
who have paid a great price to protect us all gives credit to the clients and signifi-
cantly alters the moral calculus of offender culpability and accountability in Com-
bat Veteran’s Court. This altered calculus finds its way into the institutional en-
counters ad hoc, in the local relevancies, particulars, and contingencies of the case-
at-hand, and in the prospects for ‘what can happen’, given what has already oc-
curred. The institutional encounter serves to hash-out what will count as an ‘of-
fense’, ‘relapse’, or ‘dangerous violent offender’, thereby establishing the funda-
mental terms of moral identity.  
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Like other problem-solving courts, Combat Veteran’s Court is a system of re-
sponsibility and accountability that dispenses justice, not social work. Local rea-
soning in the court about who the clients really are and the kind of caring and 
compassionate justice they deserve moves social control away from the punitive 
approach of traditional criminal courts, or the abstinence-or-punishment ap-
proach of most other problem-solving courts, and toward an approach that is 
unique to combat veterans. The court’s accomplishment of its unique operation is 
an analyzable achievement, demonstrated in the contingent detail of developing 
and competent courses of practical action. This helps us respond to ‘Shils’s com-
plaint’ in the context of Combat Veteran’s Court and enhances our understanding 
of how Garfinkel’s ‘unique adequacy requirement’ can be fleshed out in relation 
to the materials under investigation. 
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